Below are the M3AAWG published materials related to our messaging anti-abuse work. There is also a Messaging video playlist on our YouTube channel at www.youtube.com/maawg and there are a few selected videos on our website in the Training Videos and Keynotes Videos sections under the Meetings menu tab.
In marketing terms, “appending” – also known as "e-appending" or "e-pending" – is the practice of taking demographic information known (or assumed) to be related to a particular customer and matching it with other data. It is the position of M3AAWG that this is an abusive messaging practice. The January 2019 Version 1.0.1 is updated to include the European Union's GDPR and CASL.
Phishing continues to be a significant problem for hosting companies, mailbox providers, brand owners and, of course, for every internet user. This document iinforms all of these groups on the best current practices for reporting phishing URLs.
This document focuses on defining malicious domain names and provides a non-exhaustive list of possible actions that can be taken to address them.
M3AAWG Recommendations: Methods for Sharing Dynamic IP Address Space Information with Others-Updated May 2018 (2008)
Although M3AAWG recommends blocking outbound port 25 traffic as the best option for controlling the flow of unwanted email traffic from an ISP’s customer space, such blocks may not always be possible, either for the short or long term. This document offers some alternatives for these ISPs by describing methods they can use to share their dynamic space information with others and allow remote sites to reject inbound mail traffic from dynamic address space.
Updated in March 2018, this document addresses problems associated with compromised user accounts. It discusses mitigation techniques and methods of identifying compromised accounts, including recommendations to ensure the long-term security of accounts to prevent “re-compromise.”
Public Policy Comments
M3AAWG submitted these comments in response to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's request for comments on 16 CFR Part 316 of the CAN-SPAM Rule. The comments can be viewed on the FTC site at https://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/2017/08/30/comment-87
WHOIS information plays a key role in determining where to report instances of abuse involving domain names. This paper explains some of the important WHOIS elements used to fight spam, phishing, malware distribution and other threats.
M3AAWG Comments on U.S. FCC Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services
Submitted on May 27, 2016 responding to a U.S. Federal Communications Communications Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from the Wireline Competition Bureau. All comments and the FCC proposal are available at http://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/proceeding/view/view?name=16-106.
Note: The FCC released its Rules to Protect Broadband Consumer Privacy on October 26, 2016, quoting several comments from M3AAWG.
M3AAWG Email Metrics Report
First Quarter 2007
Third and Fourth Quarters 2006
Second Quarter 2006
First Quarter 2006
Fourth Quarter 2005 Report
Updates and Commentary from the Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group
None at this time.
Articles About M3AAWG
Technology, law, and the world to protect the Internet: Interview with the standards organization JPAAWG
Japan Anti-Abuse Working Group (JPAAWG) launched in May 2019 and works with M3AAWG to focus on Internet security in Japan. ITmedia spoke with Mr. Shuji Sakuraba and Mr. Nobuhiro Suemasa of JPAAWG about the group’s work, including collaboration with M3AAWG.
Cable operators are working to prevent disruptions to their networks caused by the streaming of pirated content and DDoS attacks. The article calls out CableLabs’ work with M3AAWG on the DDoS Information Sharing Project.
Anna Ward, Postmark’s head of deliverability, discusses her path to becoming an email deliverability expert and the impact of being a part of the M3AAWG community on her work.
Networks Asia - Security Asia
A joint APWG-M3AAWG survey of cybercrime responders and anti-abuse personnel indicates ICANN’s Temporary Specification for domain name WHOIS data has eliminated interventions that previously allowed investigators to stop new cybercrimes while still in the preparatory stages -- and has markedly impeded routine mitigations for many kinds of cybercrimes.