

Weaponizing Middleboxes for TCP Reflected Amplification

Kevin Bock Abdulrahman Alaraj Yair Fax
Kyle Hurley Eric Wustrow Dave Levin




Denial of Service attacks



Denial of Service attacks



Attacker



Denial of Service attacks



Attacker




Victim

Denial of Service attacks




Attacker



Victim


Reflected amplification attacks




Open Server




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
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
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
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
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
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
Reflected amplification attacks



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


Reflected amplification attacks



$$\text{Amplification factor} = \frac{|\text{Response}|}{|\text{Request}|}$$

Reflected amplification attacks




$$\text{Amplification factor} = \frac{|\text{Response}|}{|\text{Request}|}$$

54x DNS

556.9x NTP

51,000x memcached

Reflected amplification attacks




Almost all prior reflected amplification attacks use UDP

Reflected amplification attacks




UDP is connection-less



Client




Server





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
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
Reflected amplification attacks

TCP requires a threeway handshake




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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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

Reflected amplification attacks

TCP requires a threeway handshake



Reflected amplification attacks

TCP requires a threeway handshake



Some amplification due to retransmitted SYN+ACKs

This was believed to be off-limits to attackers

Our findings

TCP-based reflected amplification is *possible* and *effective*

- ▶ Five distinct attacks
- ▶ Millions of amplifiers
- ▶ Amplification factors in the millions

Found *infinite amplification* and identified *root causes*

Our findings

TCP-based reflected amplification is *possible* and *effective*




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
Use middleboxes as amplifiers!

Weaponizing middleboxes


Weaponizing middleboxes



Weaponizing middleboxes




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
Weaponizing middleboxes

Middlebox

Firewall, IDS, IPS,
Nation-state censor




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
① Middleboxes expect to miss some packets

Weaponizing middleboxes




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
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
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- ② Middleboxes *inject traffic* to block connections

Weaponizing middleboxes




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
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

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


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
Middleboxes make TCP-based amplification possible




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


Middleboxes make TCP-based amplification possible



What packets best trigger middleboxes?

Middleboxes make TCP-based amplification possible




What packets best trigger middleboxes?

What amplifications are attainable?


Methodology

① Automated Discovery



Methodology

① Automated Discovery



Methodology

① Automated Discovery

Geneva
Genetic Evasion

Train



Censored Planet

184 Censoring
middleboxes

Packet sequences

② Internet-wide Evaluation



IPv4-wide scans
(~3.7 billion)

- 35 Internet-wide scans
- Only “attacked” ourselves
- Responsibly disclosed our findings

TCP-based amplification attacks

Issue an HTTP request for **forbidden content**

Packet sequences

SYN with Request

Request

SYN ; Request

TCP-based amplification attacks

Issue an HTTP request for **forbidden content**

Packet sequences

SYN *with Request*

HTTP request
in the SYN payload

Request

SYN ; Request

TCP-based amplification attacks

Issue an HTTP request for **forbidden content**

Packet sequences

SYN with Request

HTTP request
in the SYN payload

Request

SYN ; Request

Request can be either
PSH or PSH+ACK

TCP-based amplification attacks

Issue an HTTP request for **forbidden content**

Packet sequences

SYN *with Request*

PSH

PSH+ACK

SYN ; PSH

SYN ; PSH+ACK

Middleboxes can be triggered without any ACK whatsoever

TCP-based amplification attacks

Packet sequences

SYN *with Request*

PSH

PSH+ACK

SYN ; PSH

SYN ; PSH+ACK

Variants

Details in the paper

Increased TTL

Increased wscale

TCP Segmentation

FIN+CWR

HTTP without \r\n

Increase amplification for
small fractions of middleboxes

TCP-based amplification attacks

Packet sequences

SYN *with Request*

PSH

PSH+ACK

SYN ; PSH

SYN ; PSH+ACK

Triggering domains

www.youporn.com porn

www.roxypalace.com gambling

plus.google.com social

www.bittorent.com file sharing

www.survive.org.uk sex health

TCP-based amplification attacks

Packet sequences

SYN *with Request*

PSH

PSH+ACK

SYN ; PSH

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www.survive.org.uk sex health

Middleboxes differ in their bugs and their configurations

How can we evaluate this attack?




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
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
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
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
How can we evaluate this attack?




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
Amplification by packet sequence



Amplification by packet sequence




Amplification by packet sequence




Amplification by packet sequence

Triggered with www.youporn.com



Amplification by packet sequence


Triggered with www.youporn.com



Packet sequences differ in amplification and number of amplifiers

Amplification by packet sequence


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Packet sequences differ in amplification and number of amplifiers


Amplification by packet sequence

Triggered with `www.youporn.com`




Packet sequences differ in amplification and number of amplifiers

Amplification by triggering domain




Amplification by triggering domain



Different triggering domains can yield drastically different amplification


Maximum amplification

Assuming a perfectly-informed attacker




Maximum amplification

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
Maximum amplification

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
Maximum amplification

Assuming a perfectly-informed attacker



Maximum amplification


Assuming a perfectly-informed attacker



TCP-based amplification is at least as powerful
as UDP-based alternatives


Maximum amplification

Assuming a perfectly-informed attacker




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
Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




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
Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops



Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Sometimes, *any* packet re-triggers censorship

Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




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Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Sometimes, *any* packet re-triggers censorship


Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops




Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops



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


Mega-amplifier cause #1: Victim-sustained loops






Victim-sustained amplification can be effectively *infinite*

Attacks the victim's downlink *and* uplink


Mega-amplifier cause #2




Mega-amplifier cause #2




Mega-amplifier cause #2




Mega-amplifier cause #2




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
Mega-amplifier cause #2




Mega-amplifier cause #2: Routing loops




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
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
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
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
Mega-amplifier cause #2: Routing loops




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Mega-amplifier cause #2: Routing loops



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


Mega-amplifier cause #2: Routing loops



Finite routing loops \Rightarrow Greater amplification with higher TTL

Mega-amplifier cause #2: Routing loops



Finite routing loops \Rightarrow Greater amplification with higher TTL

Infinite routing loops \Rightarrow *Infinite amplification*

Notable Amplifiers

- ∞  ISP in Russia
- 949,387x  Holiday Inn & Suites, Salt Lake City, USA
- 93,352x  National Bank of Bahrain
- 9,084x  Private Residence in Richardson Texas, USA
- 4,471x  LACNIC Regional IP address Registry
- 1,265x  International Bank Center, GuangZhou
- 312x  University of Ghent, Belgium
- 239x  City of Jacksonville, Florida
- 20x  Entire Country of Saudi Arabia

Even defensive middleboxes pose a threat to the Internet

Responsible Disclosure

6 months prior to publication

CERTs

Firewall
Manufacturers

DDoS
Protection

Other details in the paper

Middlebox fingerprints

Fingerprints of packets from middleboxes

Confirmed middleboxes

TTL limited experiments to confirm most reflectors are middleboxes

Routing loop analysis

Details on prefixes that have abusable routing loops

National firewalls

Analysis of impact of national firewalls

In the Wild

TCP Middlebox Reflection: Coming to a DDoS Near You



Security Intelligence Response
Team
March 01, 2022

Share



The Akamai Security Intelligence

...peaking at 11 Gbps at 1.5 Mpps...

Middleboxes complicate defenses

Respond with **larger amounts** of data

With **unexpected TCP flags**

While **ignoring** protocol signals to stop

```
17:54:20.399947 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [S], seq 0:33, win 8192, length 33
17:54:20.685491 IP Z.Z.Z.Z.443 > X.X.X.X.45678: Flags [S], seq 1300:2156, win 8760, options [mss 1360], length 856
17:54:20.685521 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 2157, win 0, length 0
17:54:20.685563 IP Z.Z.Z.Z.443 > X.X.X.X.45678: Flags [S], seq 0:1300, win 8760, options [mss 1360], length 1300
17:54:20.685568 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 4294966441, win 0, length 0
```

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17:54:20.399947 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [S], seq 0:33, win 8192, length 33
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17:54:20.685521 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 2157, win 0, length 0
17:54:20.685563 IP Z.Z.Z.Z.443 > X.X.X.X.45678: Flags [S], seq 0:1300, win 8760, options [mss 1360], length 1300
17:54:20.685568 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 4294966441, win 0, length 0
```




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17:54:20.685521 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 2157, win 0, length 0
17:54:20.685563 IP Z.Z.Z.Z.443 > X.X.X.X.45678: Flags [S], seq 0:1300, win 8760, options [mss 1360], length 1300
17:54:20.685568 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 4294966441, win 0, length 0
```




Middleboxes complicate defenses

Respond with **larger amounts** of data



With **unexpected TCP flags**

While **ignoring** protocol signals to stop

```
17:54:20.399947 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [S], seq 0:33, win 8192, length 33
17:54:20.685491 IP Z.Z.Z.Z.443 > X.X.X.X.45678: Flags [S], seq 1300:2156, win 8760, options [mss 1360], length 856
17:54:20.685521 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 2157, win 0, length 0
17:54:20.685563 IP Z.Z.Z.Z.443 > X.X.X.X.45678: Flags [S], seq 0:1300, win 8760, options [mss 1360], length 1300
17:54:20.685568 IP X.X.X.X.45678 > Z.Z.Z.Z.443: Flags [R.], seq 0, ack 4294966441, win 0, length 0
```




Attackers are still optimizing




What's optimal?



Attackers are still optimizing



Attackers are still optimizing




Weaponizing Middleboxes

Middleboxes make
TCP-based reflected amplification
possible and effective

Automated discovery of
new amplification attacks

Root causes of ∞ -amplification:
Victim-sustained & Routing-loops



Code and website

[censorship.ai](https://www.censorship.ai)