

# **M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Series**

Mike Adkins, Paul Midgen DMARC.org October 22, 2012



# **M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Videos**

(2.5 hours of training)

This is Segment 1 of 6 The complete series of DMARC training videos is available at: <u>https://www.m3aawg.org/activities/maawg-training-series-videos</u>

<u>Segment 1</u> What is DMARC? (about 20 minutes)	<u>Segment 2</u> DMARC Identifier Alignment (about 20 minutes)	<u>Segment 3</u> DMARC Policy Records (about 30 minutes)
<u>Segment 4</u> DMARC Reporting (about 15 minutes)	<u>Segment 5</u> DMARC Information for Mailbox Providers (about 20 minutes)	<u>Segment 6</u> DMARC Information for Domain Owners and 3 <sup>rd</sup> Parties (about 40 minutes)



## What is DMARC?

**DMARC Segment 1 – about 20 minutes** 

Mike Adkins, Paul Midgen, DMARC.org October 22, 2012

## Outline

## Part 1

- Introduction to DMARC
  - Purpose and Goals
  - History
  - Roadmap
- DMARC Spec Overview
  - Identifier Alignment
  - DMARC Policy Records
  - Reporting
- Short Break

## Part 2

- Information for Domain Owners
  - The Reporting and Compliance
     Process
    - Initial Record Publishing
    - 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Deployment Profiles
    - Report Processing and Analysis

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MESSAGING MALWARE MOBILE

- Initial Policy Ramp-up
- Ongoing Monitoring
- Information for Mailbox Providers
  - DMARC Policy Enforcement
  - Aggregate Reporting
  - Forensic Reporting

### Things we won't cover



- Why phishing is a problem.
- How DKIM, SPF, DNS, SMTP, or XML work.
- How to combat abuse of cousin domains or the display name field.
- Phishing website investigation or takedown services.

### Who is in the audience?



- Mailbox providers?
- Domain owners?
- Domain owners who use 3<sup>rd</sup> party senders?
- 3<sup>rd</sup> party senders (ESPs, hosting providers, etc)?





DMARC = Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance

- Authentication Leverage existing technology (DKIM and SPF)
- Reporting Gain visibility with aggregate and per-failure reports
- Conformance Standardize identifiers, provide flexible policy actions

## Intro to DMARC – Purpose and Goals



- Open version of existing private mechanisms for preventing domain spoofing.
- Standardize use of authenticated identifiers.
- Provide insight into and debugging aids for your authentication practices.
- Incent wider adoption of SPF & DKIM.
- Encourage iteration toward aggressive authentication policy.

## Intro to DMARC – Non-Goals



- Address cousin domain abuse
- Address display name abuse
- Provide MUA treatment advice
- An enterprise security solution
- An incident response tool
- Provide delivery reporting

### **Intro to DMARC - History**



- Private Prototype between Paypal and Yahoo 2007
- Vendors being offering similar functionality 2009 to present
- First Prototype DMARC records published Feb '11
- Draft specification released Jan 30th 2012, revised April '12

## **Intro to DMARC - Roadmap**



- Interop Event July '12
- Produce a final draft
- Submit to the IETF



### This has been the first of six DMARC video segments

### View the entire M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Series

from the public training video pages on the M<sup>3</sup>AAWG website at: <u>https://www.m3aawg.org/activities/maawg-training-series-videos</u>

Our thanks to Michael Adkins, Paul Midgen and DMARC.org for developing the material in this series and allowing M<sup>3</sup>AAWG to videotape it for professionals worldwide.

This video is presented by the Messaging, Malware and Mobile Anti-Abuse Working Group

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# M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Videos

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<u>Segment 1</u> What is DMARC? (about 20 minutes)	<u>Segment 2</u> DMARC Identifier Alignment (about 20 minutes)	<u>Segment 3</u> DMARC Policy Records (about 30 minutes)
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MSAAWG Zour General Meeting | Baltinore, October 2012



# **DMARC Identifier Alignment**


**DMARC Segment 2 – about 20 minutes** 

Mike Adkins, DMARC.org and M<sup>3</sup>AAWG Co-Vice Chairman October 22, 2012



### **DMARC Spec Overview**





## **DMARC Spec – Identifier Alignment**



- DMARC tests and enforces Identifier Alignment
- Authenticated Identifiers are checked against Mail User Agent (MUA) visible "RFC5322.From" domain
- Only one Authenticated Identifier has to Align for the email to be considered in Alignment

## **DMARC Spec – Identifier Alignment**



- Identifier Alignment can be strict (match exactly) or relaxed:
  - Relaxed SPF: The Organizational Domain of the SPF Authenticated RFC5321:Mail From and RFC5322:From must match.
  - Relaxed DKIM: The Organizational domain from 'd=' value of DKIM authenticated signature and RFC5322.From must match.

## **DMARC Spec – Identifier Alignment**



## **Organizational Domain**

- TLD + 1 atom
  - groups.facebook.com = facebook.com
  - aol.co.uk = aol.co.uk
  - foo.bar.example.ne.jp = example.ne.jp
- Uses publicsuffix.org for TLD list
- More robust methods being considered



### **SPF and DKIM Strict Identifier Alignment**

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com
designates 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple;
q=dns/txt; i=@example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
Version:Content-Type; bh=0l5o8r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/11W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
+svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/18z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY
LXONpLsSymtoeqTBY0OJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;
```

From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

- SPF domain = example.com
- DKIM domain = example.com
- From domain = example.com



### **SPF Strict Identifier Alignment**

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
```

Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com designates 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

- SPF domain = example.com
- From domain = example.com



### **DKIM Strict Identifier Alignment**

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=neutral (mail.com: domain of
        postmaster@example.com does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender)
        smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple;
        q=dns/txt; i=@example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
        Version:Content-Type; bh=0l5o8r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
        b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/llW+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjYl/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
        +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY
        LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;
```

From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

- DKIM domain = example.com
- From domain = example.com



### SPF and DKIM Strict Unaligned

```
Return-Path:postmaster@phish.com
```

q=dns/txt; i=@example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=; b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/11W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYEOg1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;

From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

- SPF domain = phish.com
- From domain = example.com



### SPF and DKIM Strict Unaligned

```
Return-Path:postmaster@foo.example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com
designates 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@bar.example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=bar.example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple;
q=dns/txt; i=@facebookmail.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/llW+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjYl/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
+svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYEOg1BNL/I8z1MKPmV0f/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY
LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;
```

From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

- SPF domain = foo.example.com
- DKIM domain = bar.example.com
- From domain = example.com



### **SPF and DKIM Relaxed Alignment**

- SPF domain = bounce.example.com
- SPF Organizational domain = example.com
- DKIM domain = bounce.example.com
- DKIM Organizational domain = example.com
- From domain = foo.example.com
- From Organizational domain = example.com



### **SPF Relaxed Alignment**

- SPF domain = example.com
- SPF Organizational domain = example.com
- From domain = example.com
- From Organizational domain = example.com



### **DKIM Relaxed Alignment**

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=neutral (mail.com: domain of
        postmaster@example.com does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender)
        smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@foo.example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=foo.example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple;
        q=dns/txt; i=@foo.example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
        Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
        b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/l1W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
        +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYEOg1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY
        LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;
```

From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

- DKIM domain = foo.example.com
- DKIM Organizational domain = example.com
- From domain = example.com
- From Organizational domain = example.com



### SPF and DKIM Relaxed Unaligned

From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

- SPF domain = phish.com
- SPF Organizational domain = phish.com
- From domain = example.com
- From Organizational domain = example.com



### Exercise 1 Is SPF in Strict Alignment?

Return-Path:postmaster@example.com Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=neutral (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@example.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME- Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=; b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/llW+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ1l 0cy +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYEOg1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY LXONpLsSymtoeqTBY00JqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=; From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>



### Exercise 1 Is SPF in Strict Alignment?

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=neutral (mail.com: domain of
        postmaster@example.com does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender)
        smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple;
        q=dns/txt; i=@example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
        Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
        b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/llW+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
        +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY
        LXONpLsSymtoeqTBY00JqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;
From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>
```

#### Answer: No, SPF did not pass.

#### Is the email Aligned anyway?



### Exercise 1 Is SPF in Strict Alignment?

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=neutral (mail.com: domain of
        postmaster@example.com does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender)
        smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple;
        q=dns/txt; i=@example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
        Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
        b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/11W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
        +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/I8z1MKPmV0f/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY
        LXONpLsSymtoeqTBY00JqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;
From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>
```

#### Answer: No, SPF did not pass.

#### Is the email Aligned anyway?

Answer: Yes, DKIM is in Strict Alignment, so the email is Aligned regardless.



### Exercise 2 Is SPF in Relaxed Alignment?



### Exercise 2 Is SPF in Relaxed Alignment?

Answer: Yes, foo.example.com shares the same Organizational domain as example.com.



### Exercise 3 Is DKIM in Strict Alignment?



### Exercise 3 Is DKIM in Strict Alignment?

#### Answer: No, foo.example.com does not exactly match example.com

#### Under what conditions would the email be Aligned?



### Exercise 3 Is DKIM in Strict Alignment?

#### Answer: No, foo.example.com does not exactly match example.com

#### Under what conditions would the email be Aligned?

Answer: Since SPF does not pass, the email would only be Aligned if Relaxed DKIM Alignment was allowed.



### Exercise 4 Under what conditions would this email be considering in Alignment?



### Exercise 4 Under what conditions would this email be considering in Alignment?

Answer: None. Neither DKIM nor SPF are valid.

Assuming DKIM and SPF were actually valid, under what conditions would this email be considered Aligned?



### Exercise 4 Under what conditions would this email be considering in Alignment?

Answer: None. Neither DKIM nor SPF are valid.

# Assuming DKIM and SPF were actually valid, under what conditions would this email be considered Aligned?

Answer: If Relaxed Alignment was allowed for either DKIM or SPF, the email would be Aligned.



#### This has been the second of six DMARC video segments

### View the entire M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Series

from the public training video pages on the M<sup>3</sup>AAWG website at: <u>https://www.m3aawg.org/activities/maawg-training-series-videos</u>

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Contact us at: <a href="https://www.m3aawg.org/contact">https://www.m3aawg.org/contact</a> form



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### **DMARC Policy Records**

**DMARC Segment 3 – about 30 minutes** 

Mike Adkins, Paul Midgen, DMARC.org October 22, 2012

### **DMARC Spec – Policy Records**



- TXT records in DNS
  - \_dmarc.example.com
- Check for a record at the exact RFC5322.From
  - If no record is found, check for a record at the Organizational domain of the RFC5322.From
- Policy options:
  - "none" simply monitor and supply feedback
  - "quarantine" process email with high degree of suspicion
  - "reject" do not accept email that fails DMARC check

### **DMARC Spec – Policy Records**



Тад	Purpose	Example
V	Protocol Version	v=DMARC1
р	Policy for the domain	p=quarantine
sp	Policy for subdomains	sp=reject
pct	% of messages subject to policy	pct=20
adkim	Alignment mode for DKIM	adkim=s
aspf	Alignment mode for SPF	aspf=r
rua	Reporting URI for aggregate reports	rua=mailto:aggrep@example.com
ruf	Reporting URI of forensic reports	ruf=mailto:authfail@example.com
rf	Forensic reporting format	rf=afrf
ri	Aggregate reporting interval	ri=14400

**DMARC Spec – Example Policy Records** 



Everyone's first DMARC record

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:aggregate@example.com;

### **DMARC Spec – Example Policy Records**



Dipping a toe in the pool

v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=10; rua=mailto:agg@ex.com; ruf=mailto:fail@ex.com;

### **DMARC Spec – Example Policy Records**



Very aggressive. 100% reject.

dig -t TXT \_dmarc.facebookmail.com

v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; rua=<u>mailto:postmaster@facebook.com,mailto:d@rua.agari.com;</u> ruf=<u>mailto:d@ruf.agari.com;</u>



Exercise 1 Is this a valid record?

p=none; pct=50; rua=postmaster@example.com;



Exercise 1 Is this a valid record?

p=none; pct=50; rua=postmaster@example.com;

Answer: No. The v= tag is required.



Exercise 2 What DNS TXT record will be queried for mail from foo.example.com?



### Exercise 2 What DNS TXT record will be queried for mail from foo.example.com?

Answer: \_dmarc.foo.example.com

If no record is found, what will happen?



### Exercise 2 What DNS TXT record will be queried for mail from foo.example.com?

Answer: \_dmarc.foo.example.com

If no record is found, what will happen?

Answer: \_dmarc.example.com will be queried.



### Exercise 3 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com;

#### Is this email Aligned?

Return-Path:postmaster@foo.example.com Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com designates 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@foo.example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@bar.example.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=bar.example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@bar.example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=; b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/l1W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=; From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>



### Exercise 3 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com;

#### Is this email Aligned?

Return-Path:postmaster@foo.example.com Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com designates 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@foo.example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@bar.example.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=bar.example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@bar.example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=; b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/llW+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjYl/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=; From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@example.com>

Answer: Yes. Alignment is Relaxed by default.



#### Exercise 4 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; adkim=s; aspf=r;

#### Is this email Aligned?



#### Exercise 4 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; adkim=s; aspf=r;

#### Is this email Aligned?

Answer: No. SPF did not pass. DKIM passed, but DKIM Alignment is in strict mode and the DKIM domain does not exactly match the From domain.



#### Exercise 4 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; adkim=s; aspf=r;

#### Is this email Aligned?

#### Then what will happen to the email?



### Exercise 4 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; adkim=s; aspf=r;

#### Is this email Aligned?

#### Then what will happen to the email?

Answer: No policy action will be taken. The results will be included in the requested aggregate report and the message will be processed as normal.



### Exercise 5 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; ruf=postmaster@example.com adkim=s; aspf=s; sp=reject;

#### Is this email Aligned?

Return-Path:postmaster@example.com Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@foo.example.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=foo.example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@foo.example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=; b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/llW+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjYl/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy +svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY LXONpLsSymtoeqTBY00JqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=; From: "Postmaster" <postmaster@bar.example.com>



### Exercise 5 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

```
v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; ruf=postmaster@example.com
adkim=s; aspf=s; sp=reject;
```

#### Is this email Aligned?

Answer: Trick question! It depends on whether or not there is a DMARC record at \_dmarc.bar.example.com.



#### Exercise 5 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; ruf=postmaster@example.com adkim=s; aspf=s; sp=reject;

#### If there is no record at \_dmarc.bar.example.com, is this email Aligned?

Return-Path:postmaster@example.com Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com; dkim=pass header.i=@foo.example.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=foo.example.com; s=s1024-2011-g2; c=relaxed/simple; q=dns/txt; i=@foo.example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-Version:Content-Type; bh=015o8r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=; b=T6m3ZvppP3OLGNQVoR/11W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy +svp5ymrgBqnDEN/ZOEcfmzYEOq1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cL1pTVbaWi/G2VBY LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVqZYunf8h90=;

From: "Postmaster" postmaster@bar.example.com



### Exercise 5 Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; ruf=postmaster@example.com adkim=s; aspf=s; sp=reject;

#### If there is no record at \_dmarc.bar.example.com, is this email Aligned?

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com
does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com;
dkim=pass header.i=@foo.example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=foo.example.com; s=s1024-2011-q2; c=relaxed/simple;
q=dns/txt; i=@foo.example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
b=T6m3ZvppP30LGNQVoR/11W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
+svp5ymrqBgnDEN/ZQEcfmzYE0g1BNL/I8z1MKPmV0f/9cLIpTVbaWi/G2VBY
LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVgZYunf8h90=;
```

From: "Postmaster" postmaster@bar.example.com

Answer: No. Both SPF and DKIM are in Strict Alignment mode and neither exactly match the From domain.



### **Exercise 5** Given this record for \_dmarc.example.com:

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=postmaster@example.com; ruf=postmaster@example.com adkim=s; aspf=s; sp=reject;

#### If there is no record at dmarc.bar.example.com, is this email Aligned?

```
Return-Path:postmaster@example.com
Authentication-Results: mx.mail.com; spf=pass (mail.com: domain of postmaster@example.com
          does not designate 10.1.1.1 as permitted sender) smtp.mail=postmaster@example.com;
          dkim=pass header.i=@foo.example.com
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=foo.example.com; s=s1024-2011-g2; c=relaxed/simple;
          q=dns/txt; i=@foo.example.com; t=1337318096; h=From:Subject:Date:To:MIME-
          Version:Content-Type; bh=01508r4ftEPBr083MbUpe0mIrWKRs5yT46DR6CGk/Mk=;
          b=T6m3ZvppP3OLGNQVoR/11W+RxSbQiRlaCcwZpXTF/xjWk0xjY1/8S0UUvtFPHZ11 0cy
          +svp5ymrgBqnDEN/ZOEcfmzYEOq1BNL/I8z1MKPmVOf/9cL1pTVbaWi/G2VBY
          LXONpLsSymtoeqTBYOOJqoiNLzDNP01pVqZYunf8h90=;
```

From: "Postmaster" postmaster@bar.example.com

#### Then what will happen to the email?

Answer: It will be rejected due to the subdomain policy action sp=reject. The results will be included in the requested aggregate report, and a forensic report will be sent.



#### This has been the third of six DMARC video segments

### View the entire M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Series

from the public training video pages on the M<sup>3</sup>AAWG website at: <u>https://www.m3aawg.org/activities/maawg-training-series-videos</u>

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### **M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Series**

Mike Adkins, Paul Midgen DMARC.org October 22, 2012



### **M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Videos**

(2.5 hours of training)

This is Segment 4 of 6 The complete series of DMARC training videos is available at: <u>https://www.m3aawg.org/activities/maawg-training-series-videos</u>

<u>Segment 1</u> What is DMARC? (about 20 minutes)	<u>Segment 2</u> DMARC Identifier Alignment (about 20 minutes)	<u>Segment 3</u> DMARC Policy Records (about 30 minutes)
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## DMARC Reporting

DMARC Segment 4 – about 15 minutes

Paul Midgen, DMARC.org October 22, 2012

### **DMARC Spec – Reporting**



### **Aggregate Reports**

- Each report covers one RFC5322.From domain.
- You should get one from each supporting mailbox provider that sees email with your From domain.
- Daily by default, adjustable with ri= tag. Hourly : ri=3600

### **XML** Format

- Organized by sending IP address
- Contains
  - Authentication Results (DKIM, SPF)
  - Alignment Results
  - Policy actions taken
  - Reasons for not taking policy actions

#### Just publish a record to see one



#### **XML** Format



#### XML Format

```
An example record.
<record>
  <row>
    <source ip>106.10.148.108</source ip>
    <count>1</count>
    <policy evaluated>
      <disposition>none</disposition>
      <dkim>pass</dkim>
      <spf>fail</spf>
    </policy evaluated>
  </row>
  <identifiers>
    <header from>facebookmail.com</header from>
  </identifiers>
  <auth results>
    <dkim>
      <domain>facebookmail.com</domain>
      <result>pass</result>
    </dkim>
    <spf>
      <domain>NULL</domain>
      <result>none</result>
    </spf>
  </auth results>
</record>
```



#### **Forensic Reports**

- One per DMARC failure
- AFRF or IODEF formats
- Should include 'call-to-action' URIs
- Throttling
- Privacy issues
  - Might be redacted
  - Might not be supported



#### **DMARC URLs**

Advertise the maximum report size a destination URI will accept

mailto:aggregate@example.com!25M

Works for both report types.



#### Verifying 3<sup>rd</sup> party report destinations

If the record for example.com contains reporting URIs at other domains:

mailto:aggregate@foo.com

Report generators should verify that foo.com expects the reports by looking for:

example.com.\_report.\_dmarc.foo.com

The 3<sup>rd</sup> party can change the URI to a different address in their domain:

v=DMARC1; rua=mailto:reports@foo.com



#### This has been the fourth of six DMARC video segments

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Contact us at: <a href="https://www.m3aawg.org/contact">https://www.m3aawg.org/contact</a> form



# M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Series

Mike Adkins, Paul Midgen DMARC.org October 22, 2012



# **M<sup>3</sup>AAWG DMARC Training Videos**

(2.5 hours of training)

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**DMARC Segment 5 – about 20 minutes** 

Paul Midgen, DMARC.org October 22, 2012



## Are you ready for DMARC?

- Do you need DMARC?
  - Understand what DMARC does for the messaging ecosystem.
  - Who are you receiving mail from?
- Review your SPF and DKIM practices.
  - Why validate both?
- Develop a local-policy strategy.
  - Special cases
  - Trusted domains
- Commit to Reporting
- Outbound?



# **Policy Enforcement in Review**

- Evaluate SPF & DKIM according to the RFC.
  - Bonus points: use Authentication-Results
- Select applicable authentication results using alignment.
  - This only determines whether the results are used.
- No aligned and passing results? DMARC validation has failed – time to enforce!
  - None: message disposition is unchanged; "report only"
  - Quarantine: don't deliver to the inbox.
  - Reject: don't deliver at all.



# **Reporting in Review**

#### **Aggregate Reporting**

- XML data correlating IPs, domains, and authentication results.
- Requires ability to aggregate & store data extracted from inbound messages. This can require a lot of storage.
- Specification is currently least-documented part of DMARC, join dmarc-discuss and ask questions.

#### **Failure Reporting**

- Copies of messages failing DMARC validation sent to the sender or their agent.
- Don't queue. Sending as close to receipt as possible maximizes value.



# **Operational Considerations**

- v usually DMARC policy is the sender's policy and should have higher ulletpriority than local and other policy.
- Consider ways to mitigate the impact of MLMs, forwarders, and so ٠ on.
  - These waters are deep. Fish with large teeth. Be deliberate, • researched, and iterative.



# **Reporting and Privacy**

Forensic reports can send an unaltered message to someone other than the intended recipient.

It may not be from a bad actor.

- Do a privacy review!
- Understand applicable privacy regimes before sending reports.
  - Corporate
  - Federal/Legal
  - Only one US-based MBP is sending failure reports

#### Resources



Dmarc.org

# Resources page for tools Participate page for list sign up



This has been the fifth of six DMARC video segments

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Mike Adkins, Paul Midgen DMARC.org October 22, 2012



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DMARC Information for Doman Owners and 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties DMARC Segment 6 – about 40 minutes

Michael Adkins, DMARC.org and M<sup>3</sup>AAWG Co-Vice Chairman October 22, 2012




### **Information for Domain Owners**



- The Reporting and Compliance Process
  - Initial Record Publishing
  - 3<sup>rd</sup> Party Deployment Profiles
  - Report Processing and Analysis
  - Rolling out Policies
  - Long Term Monitoring

## The Reporting and Compliance Process For Domain Owners










Everyone's first DMARC record

v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:aggregate@example.com;

## **3rd Party Deployment Profiles**





**Controlled** – The Domain Owner fully controls their own DNS, and wants as much control over their email as possible.

**Authorized** – The Domain Owner lets the 3<sup>rd</sup> party dictate the content of some DNS records, while still retaining some operational control.

**Delegated** – The Domain Owner delegates control of their DNS to the 3<sup>rd</sup> party, and wants to be mostly hands-off with their email.

**Hosted** – The Domain Owner allows the 3<sup>rd</sup> party to handle everything, and has little control



## Controlled

The Domain Owner retains control of the domain or subdomain, provides a DKIM signing key to 3rd party and publishes the public key, and includes the appropriate information in their SPF record.

#### Pro

- This scenario allows 3rd parties to send as the organizational domain if desired.
- The Domain Owner retains operational control.

#### Cons

- Coordination between the domain owner and the 3rd party mailer is required to ensure proper DKIM key rotation, accurate SPF records, etc.
- Risk of coordination overhead/issues increases as the number of bilateral relationships increase for domain owners and vendors.



## Controlled

Contractual points

- Process for DKIM key rotation. Obligations of each party, including testing.
- SPF record requirements and process for adding new hosts.



## Authorized

Similar to Controlled Profile, except the 3<sup>rd</sup> party creates the DKIM key pair and generally takes a more active role in dictating record content. This approach is useful for Domain Owners where a different 3<sup>rd</sup> party is providing DNS and other services for the domain.

#### Pros

- Can streamline provisioning for the 3<sup>rd</sup> party.
- One less task for the Domain Owner.

#### Cons

- Can create additional management issues for Domain Owners who use multiple 3<sup>rd</sup> parties.
- Possible additional contractual point for key strength requirements.



### Delegated

The Domain Owner delegates a subdomain to 3rd party mailer and relies on contractual relationship to ensure appropriate SPF records, DKIM signing, and DMARC records.

#### Pros

- Reduces Domain Owner implementation issues to mostly contractual.
- The 3rd party is responsible for SPF records, DKIM signing and publishing, etc.
- Domain owner may still be responsible for ensuring Identifier Alignment.

#### Con

• The Domain Owner potentially gives up day to day control and visibility into operations and conformance.



## Delegated

Contractual points

- Creation and maintenance of SPF, DKIM and DMARC records
- (Quarterly) Rotation of DKIM keys and minimum length of key (1024 recommended)
- Investigation of DMARC rejections
- Handling of DMARC Reports
- Requirements for reporting back to the Domain Owner
- Indemnification (if any) for mail lost due to improper records or signatures.



The 3rd party is also providing DNS, webhosting, etc for the Domain Owner and makes the process mostly transparent to the domain owner.

Pro

- Very easy for less sophisticated Domain Owners.
- Can be mostly automated by the 3<sup>rd</sup> party.

Con

• The domain owner is significantly more dependent on the 3<sup>rd</sup> party.




# 3<sup>rd</sup> Party responsibilities

	Controlled	Authorized	Delegated	Hosted
Provide SPF record content	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maintain SPF records	N	N	Y	Y
Maintain DKIM records	N	N	Y	Y
Create DKIM Keys	N	Y	Y	Y
Rotate DKIM Keys	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maintain DMARC Records	N	N	Y	Y
Process DMARC reports	Ν	?	?	Y

## **Report Processing and Analysis**





# **Report Processing and Analysis**



**Report Parsing Tools** 

http://dmarc.org/resources.html

If you develop report parsing tools you are willing to share, please send a note to the dmarc-discuss list and let us know.

# **Report Processing and Analysis**



#### **Step 1: Categorize the IPs in the Aggregate Report**

- Your Infrastructure
- Authorized 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties
- Unauthorized 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties \*
- \* You should consider everything an Unauthorized 3<sup>rd</sup> Party by default.

# Report Processing and Analysis – Infrastructure Auditing



**Step 2: Infrastructure Auditing** 

For both your Infrastructure and Authorized 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties

- Identify owners
- LOE for Deploying Domain Authentication
- LOE for Identifier Alignment
- Business case / Justification

# **Report Processing and Analysis**



**Step 3: Identify Malicious Email** 

#### **Research Unauthorized 3rd Parties and label the Abusers**

- Use public data sources
- Vendor services
- Look for known failure cases
- Forensic reports

# **Report Processing and Analysis**



#### **Step 4: Perform Threat Assessment**

#### Categories

- Your Infrastructure
- Authorized 3<sup>rd</sup> parties
- Unauthorized 3<sup>rd</sup> parties
- Abusers

Calculate the Sum of Unaligned Email from each Category

# **Report Processing and Analysis**



#### **Step 4: Perform Threat Assessment**

**Phish** = Unaligned Email From Abusers

**Definite False Positives** = Unaligned Email from Your Infrastructure + Unaligned Email from Authorized 3<sup>rd</sup> parties


**Potential False Positives** = Unaligned Email from Unauthorized 3<sup>rd</sup> parties

#### **Consider:**

- Phish vs. False Positives
- Phish vs. Total Aligned Email

If there is no Phish, you don't have a Domain Spoofing problem and don't need to move forward with DMARC policies.







Step 1: Verify Authentication and Alignment for all of your Infrastructure and all Authorized 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties.

Step 2: Update your record to:

```
p=quarantine; pct=10;
```

Do not:

- Skip 'quarantine' and go straight to 'reject'
- Change the policy action from 'none' without setting a 'pct'



Step 3: Monitor your reports for issues and address them.

Make a 'go forward / go back' decision.

Step 4: Update your record to increase the 'pct'.

Rinse and repeat until you get to 'pct=100'.




Step 5: If needed, update your record to:

p=reject

# **Ongoing Monitoring**





## **Ongoing Monitoring**



- Categorize new IPs in Aggregate reports
  - Your Infrastructure
  - Authorized 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties
  - Unauthorized 3<sup>rd</sup> Parties
  - Abusers
- Reassess the Threat Level
  - Increases in phish
  - Changes in unaligned email volume
  - Make changes accordingly
  - Takedowns or other phish responses

# **Ongoing Monitoring**



Be on the look out for:

- Infrastructure changes
- New products / new subdomains
- New authorized 3<sup>rd</sup> parties
- Mergers and acquisitions

### Resources



Dmarc.org

## Resources page for tools Participate page for list sign up



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